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Abstract 
 
This article is focused on answering the question to what extent one is able to be a sceptic. Sextus Empiricus’s 
Outlines of Scepticism serves as a guide. In section 1, it is investigated whether three logical laws have a certain 
foundation or are subject to doubt. In section 2, Sextus’s way to deal with these laws is examined; the question 
arises how dogmatic his approach is. After that, a possible ‘reply’ by Sextus to the criticism receives attention. 
Section 3 is concentrated on a possible alternative to Sextus’s approach. Besides logical laws, some important 
methods are concerned. 
 
Zusammenfassung 
 
Dieser Artikel konzentriert sich darauf, die Frage zu beantworten, inwieweit man ein Skeptiker sein kann. Sextus 
Empiricus’ Grundzüge des Skeptizismus dienen als Anleitung. In Abschnitt 1 wird untersucht, ob drei logische 
Gesetze eine sichere Fundierung aufweisen oder Zweifeln unterliegen. In Abschnitt 2 wird Sextus’ Art, mit 
diesen Gesetzen umzugehen, betrachtet. Die Frage erhebt sich, wie dogmatisch sein Ansatz ist. Danach wird 
eine mögliche Antwort von Sextus auf diese Kritik betrachtet. Im Mittelpunkt von Abschnitt 3 steht eine mögliche 
Alternative zu Sextus’ Ansatz. Neben logischen Gesetzen werden einige wichtige Methoden behandelt. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The influence of scepticism on modern thinking is great. A new theory on any subject is thoroughly 
investigated before it is accepted (or not). The method of scepticism may be valuable in preventing an 
uncritical approach. This doesn’t mean, of course, that this method itself can’t be examined critically. 
In this article, I will inquire into the consistency of the ideas of an important classical sceptic, Sextus 
Empiricus. He presents a great number of arguments why one should embrace the sceptical method, 
but it seems he uses a number of standards he doesn’t allow others to accept. This applies in particular 
to three basic laws of logic. 
In order to make it clear what relevance these have to the discussion, they will be dealt with in 
section 1, by showing what their status is in a present perspective. After all, if they were to be 
acknowledged beyond any doubt to be useful means, the issue that Sextus uses them would be non-
existent. This is, however, not the case, as will be shown. In section 2, it will be enquired what 
Sextus’s attitude towards the said laws of logic is. His perspective on logic is most clearly presented in 
his Outlines of Scepticism,1 which is the main reason I have concentrated on his presentation in that 
work. It is of importance to ascertain to what extent Sextus relies on the laws of logic in order to be 
able to find out whether he may really be qualified as a consistent sceptic. 
 In section 3, the relevance of two other reasonable criteria is explored; does Sextus maintain 
that an infinite regression and a logical circle are problematic, and, if so, does this further endanger 
Sextus’s position as a sceptic? An alternative to scepticism is presented in this section as well. 
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1. Logic and reason 
 
In this section, I will expound some basic ideas of a few important logicians and indicate the 
differences between their points of view. The relevance for scepticism will primarily become clear in 
section 2, but in the treatment of the logical laws some attention will already be devoted to them. 
                                                     
1 Long, A.A., “Sextus Empiricus on the criterion of truth”, p. 32. 
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1.1 
 
An important thought for Frege (1848-1925) was the objectivity of logic. Frege wanted to point out 
logic’s correct place and prevent a mixture with the inner world: “In order to exclude any 
misunderstanding and not to let the boundary between psychology and logic fade, I give logic the task 
to find the laws of truth, not those of appearance or thinking. In the laws of truth, the meaning of the 
word “true” is developed.”2 
 With this, the thought is connected that the True and the False are independently of (human) 
thinking existing truth-values: “The Thoughts are neither things of the outside world, nor 
representations. A third realm must be acknowledged.”3 This ‘third realm’ must be understood as 
independent of both the human mind and the outside world. There is a parallel with Plato’s world of 
Ideas. Frege, accordingly, is a logical realist. A consequence of his system of thought is that there is 
only room for true and false truth-values: “Under a truth-value of a statement I understand the 
circumstance under which it is true or false. Other truth-values don’t exist.”4 
 In order to illustrate how this works, an example of Bolzano (1781-1848), another logical 
realist, is enlightening. He doesn’t speak of Thoughts, but of ‘Truths as such’ (‘Wahrheite an sich’): “I 
understand by a Truth as such any arbitrary statement which states something as it is, whereby I leave 
undetermined whether this sentence is thought and expressed by someone or not.”5 
 As an example of this, he mentions a tree with a fixed number of leaves, of which this number 
is determined, whether one knows this or not: “The number of blossoms which a certain tree which 
stands in a given place carried last spring, for instance, is a supposed number, even if no-one knows it, 
etc.”6 On the basis of this case, one can state: “The tree had 1000 leaves or it didn’t.” One of these 
situations was the case. Frege maintains, as does Bolzano, the idea that the True and the False are 
values that exist independent of human thoughts. The principle of excluded middle7 is fundamental to 
him: statements are either true or false, even if no one utters them or thinks about them. 
 
[Page 38] 
 
1.2 
 
The analysis given by Brouwer (1881-1966) is completely different. Given that one may not accept 
starting-points without a well-founded reason for doing so, he only accepts theses that have been 
proved. Logic and mathematics are sciences which are not reliable as such: “Just as everything without 
religion, science has neither religious reliability nor reliability as such.”8 
Brouwer examines the syllogism, the principle of contradiction9 and the principle of excluded 
middle. The syllogism and the principle of contradiction are accepted by him; the question whether the 
principle of excluded middle holds, however, can’t be answered without induction: 
 
“(…) The whole of systems to be developed from the question [namely “the question of 
the validity of the principle of excluded middle”, p. 156, J.D.] is countably unfinished, so 
not a priori methodically examinable with respect to the presence or absence of a system 
which decides on the question. So that the principium tertii exclusi is in infinite systems 
as yet not reliable.”10 
 
                                                     
2 Frege, G., “Der Gedanke”, p. 343. 
3 Frege, G., “Der Gedanke”, p. 353. 
4 Frege, G., “Über Sinn und Bedeutung”, p. 149. 
5 Bolzano, B., Wissenschaftslehre, § 25 (p. 137). 
6 Bolzano, B., ibid. 
7 Expressed in logic as ‘p   p’. 
8 Brouwer, L., “De onbetrouwbaarheid der logische principes”, p. 152. 
9 Expressed in logic as ‘ (p   p)’. 
10 Brouwer, L., “De onbetrouwbaarheid der logische principes”, p. 157. 
 2
Brouwer indicates, in other words, that the matter whether this law holds can’t be solved purely 
reasonably, but only with the aid of experience. He doesn’t state that it doesn’t hold per se, but leaves 
room for doubt: “It is still uncertain whether the mathematical question: “Is the principium tertii 
exclusi indefinitely valid in mathematics?” has a solution.”11 
With the aid of logic one may show that there is a problem of foundation here. In order to 
indicate that there are only two values, true and false, the following proof may be given: 
 
1.  (p   p)  Assumption (the opposite of that which is to be proved is assumed in order to                            
                                       infer it from this) 
2. p   Assumption (starting-point) 
3. p   p  This may be introduced on the basis of 2 
4.    Absurdity: one obtains both ‘ (p   p)’ and its opposite, i.e. ‘p   p’12 
5.  p   From absurdity, ‘’ may be introduced 
6. p   p  From 5, ‘p’ may be introduced  
7.    Absurdity: one obtains both ‘ (p   p)’ and its opposite, i.e. ‘p   p’ 
8.  (p   p) From absurdity, ‘’ may be introduced 
9. p   p  From 8, it is stated: ‘( (p   p))   (p   p)’ 
 
According to Brouwer’s analysis, the first eight steps are justified, but the ninth isn’t. This step is 
based on the thought that there are only two truth-values. There is, in other words, a circle in logic 
here: in order to prove that there are only two values, one has to resort to the proof given above, in 
which the principle is implicitly present. Within the boundaries of logic it can’t be proved that there 
are only two values. This does not, in my opinion, mean that one has to assume that [Page 39] there 
are more than two values, but at any rate this train of thought indicates that doubt with regard to the 
principle of excluded middle is justified. 
 
1.3 
 
A more fundamental law than the principle of excluded middle is that of contradiction. As was shown 
in section 1.2, Brouwer too clang to this. It is an intuitively insightful notion; one can’t, for example, I 
suppose, imagine a situation in which it rains and doesn’t rain in the same place at the same time. Yet 
the value of this law too can be doubted. In paraconsistent logic, in which paradoxes are not rejected 
but accepted, it is not maintained: “The basic idea of paraconsistency is as simple as it is radical. The 
fundamental classical postulate that truth and falsehood are mutually exclusive is rejected and replaced 
by the idea there may be sentences of a language such that both they and their negations are true.”13 
 In this approach, when the limit of thought is set with a contradiction, in the sense that when 
one is confronted with a contradiction, one has to acknowledge that one can’t continue thinking, one 
must in fact already have passed this limit. There is, in this way of thinking, no guarantee that only one 
of two opposite values in a statement can be true: “(…) Orthodox logic assures us that for every 
statement, , only one of  and  is true. (…) Orthodox logic, however well entrenched, is just a 
theory of how logical particles, like negation, work; and there is no a priori guarantee that it is 
correct.”14 
It is not my intention to offer this analysis or the one outlined in section 1.2, by Brouwer, as a 
correct alternative for the one presented in section 1.1; for the purpose of this article, in which not the 
foundations of logic are investigated but the tenability of scepticism, it is sufficient to make clear that 
the logical laws can be doubted and are no certain starting-points. The principle of identity15 is a more 
fundamental principle than the two laws mentioned above. If one doubts this, an obstruction for 
                                                     
11 Brouwer, L., “De onbetrouwbaarheid der logische principes”, p. 158. 
12 In classical and intuitionistic logic, the principle of contradiction is accepted. This will receive attention in 
section 1.3. 
13 Priest, G., “Classical Logic aufgehoben”, p. 141. 
14 Priest, G., Beyond the limits of thought, p. 4. 
15 Expressed in logic as ‘p  p’. 
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thinking is created. Since this is particularly relevant for scepticism, I will devote attention to it in 
section 2. 
 
 
2. Sextus’s reasonable criteria 
 
In the preceding, it has been indicated that the laws of logic, although they can be doubted from 
certain angles, play an important role in the usual way of reasoning and doubting them is not 
something which happens naturally. In this section, I intend to point out that Sextus Empiricus utilises 
the logical laws as criteria in his inquiry, although he himself claims not to utilise any criteria, except 
that which appears, the phenomenon (to phainomenon),16 with which one remains on the level of 
appearance and doesn’t agree with anything. In section 2.1, some relevant passages are commented on, 
after which [Page 40] it is examined in section 2.2 whether Sextus anticipates the criticism which can 
be given of his method and what his response might be. 
 
2.1 
 
There are three ways in which Sextus deals with the logical laws. In some passages he sums up an 
argumentation, the findings of which he disagrees with; he does, however, agree, or not necessarily 
disagree, with the method used to produce these findings, a method in which the logical laws have 
been utilised. There are also instances in which he offers an argumentation himself which leans on the 
laws of logic, in which case he has a criterion himself. Finally, there are passages in which Sextus 
speaks explicitly about ‘true’ and ‘false’. In order to represent the distinction between the different 
sorts of passages, I will deal with them in three subsections. 
 
2.1.1 
 
In book 3, Sextus indicates why movement is impossible: 
 
“If something is moved, then it is moved either in a place in which it is or in a place in 
which it is not. But neither in a place in which it is (it is at rest in it, since it is in it), nor a 
place in which it is not (a thing can neither act nor be acted upon where it is not). 
Therefore nothing moves.”17  
 
As he points out himself, this argument comes from Diodorus Cronus. Sextus doesn’t agree with this 
thought – as a sceptic, he suspends judgement (“(…) We suspend judgement as to whether there is or 
is not such a thing as motion.”18). 
It is, however, important that he does not criticise the line of thought which is represented in 
the argument. As such it can be used, that is to say: the structure of the argument is not problematic, 
only the fact that another argument can be opposed to it. The thought that something can only be 
moved in a place where it is or isn’t (‘p   p’) is not criticised. 
 In order to answer the question whether something is generated, Sextus reproduces the 
argument that it can’t be: 
 
“If anything is generated, either what exists is generated or what does not exist is 
generated. But what does not exist is not generated; for nothing holds of what does not 
exist, and so being generated does not hold of it. Nor what exists. If what exists is 
generated, it is generated either insofar as it is existent or insofar as it is not existent. Now 
it is not generated insofar as it is not existent; but if it is generated insofar as it is existent, 
then since they say that what is generated comes to be different from what it was, what is 
generated will be different from what exists, i.e. it will be non-existent. Therefore what is 
                                                     
16 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, I, 22 (p. 9). 
17 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, III, 71 (p. 163). 
18 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, III, 81 (p. 166). 
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generated will be non-existent – and that is incongruous. Thus, if neither what is existent 
nor what is non-existent is generated, nothing is generated.”19 
 
Here, too, the argument is not Sextus’s; he merely points out how some think about the matter;20 he 
himself concludes that “(…) The natural science of the Dogmatists is unreal and inconceivable.”21 
[Page 41] However, the argument is left unimpaired here as well; the thought conveyed is not 
criticised but merely opposed to another one to make clear that one ought to suspend judgement. In it, 
the principle of excluded middle is expressed: the examination only concerns that which exists and 
that which doesn’t. 
The only thing Sextus does in these passages is represent the thoughts of others about a certain 
matter; the fact that he doesn’t reject their way of thinking doesn’t mean that he agrees with them. 
There are, however, passages in which Sextus presents his own thoughts regarding the logical 
structure. These are, in order to demonstrate that he utilises reasonable criteria, more convincing than 
the two mentioned above.  
 
2.1.2 
 
Sextus states that there is no proof (apodeixis).22 He nonetheless examines what might be a possible 
proof: “(…) The so-called proof will itself be either apparent to us or not apparent. If it is not apparent, 
then we shall not bring it forward with confidence. But if it is apparent to us, then since what is being 
investigated is what is apparent to animals, and the proof is apparent to us, and we are animals, then 
the proof itself will be under investigation to see whether it is true as well as apparent.”23 If a proof 
could be given, it would either have to be apparent to mankind or not, so the criterion for this proof is 
the principle of excluded middle. 
In dealing with proofs of the existence of God, Sextus states that such a proof is either clear or 
not: “(…) Anyone who tries to prove that there are gods, does so either by way of something clear or 
else by way of something unclear. Certainly not by way of something clear (…). Nor yet by way of 
something unclear.”24 For Sextus, to make clear that the fact that both a certain proof, which is clear, 
and the opposite, a proof which is unclear, don’t suffice, is apparently enough to conclude that a proof 
of God is insufficient. This conclusion is absolutely justified, but only as long as one assumes that the 
principle of excluded middle is valid, which Sextus does. 
In dealing with ‘place’ (topos), only two possibilities emerge: “(…) If there are such things as 
places, they are either generated or ungenerated.”25 There is again a logical (reasonable) criterion 
present. The same applies to the treatment of time (chronos); with regard to this, there are no more 
than two options, namely that it is finite and that it is infinite; further, that it is divisible and 
indivisible: “(…) If it is neither infinite nor finite, time does not exist at all.”26; “(…) If it is neither 
indivisible nor divisible, it does not exist.”27 Regarding the question whether something is taught, 
Sextus states that it (if any) is either corporeal or not: “(…) What is taught is either a body or 
incorporeal.”28 
The advantage of the strategy which consists in doubting both a certain matter and its opposite 
is obvious: in this way, one may consistently deprive both possibilities to defend something of their 
persuasiveness and therefore (as these [Page 42] are the only possibilities available) conclude that one 
should suspend judgement. The question remains if this strategy is justified. If Sextus had not regarded 
                                                     
19 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, III, 112, 113 (pp. 173, 174). 
20 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, III, 112 (p. 173). 
21 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, III, 114 (p. 174). 
22 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, I, 60 (p. 17). 
23 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, I, 60 (pp. 17, 18). 
24 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, III, 7, 8 (pp. 144, 145). 
25 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, III, 132 (p. 179). 
26 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, III, 142 (p. 181). 
27 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, III, 143 (p. 181). 
28 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, III, 255 (p. 210). 
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himself a sceptic, there would be no problem. Since he did, however, a treatment in which criteria to 
reach conclusions are utilised is problematic for him. 
This applies to the principle of contradiction as well. This, too, is used by Sextus in many 
instances. When dealing with the possible proof, he points out that, since something can’t be 
simultaneously convincing and unconvincing, which applies to a possible proof, one has no proofs: 
“(…) It is absurd to try to establish the matter under investigation through the matter under 
investigation, since the same thing will then be both convincing and unconvincing (…), which is 
impossible.”29 (The argumentation is a continuation of passage I, 60 quoted above.) 
In book 3, in which a great number of issues are treated, a large area of application is at 
Sextus’s disposal. Concerning the material principles which underlie everything else, many different 
opinions have been expressed. Sextus’s goal, from his sceptical angle, is to point out that concerning 
this one should not defend a – dogmatic – position, but suspend judgement. He does this by opposing 
these positions to each other, in which he utilises the principle of contradiction: 
 
“(…) We shall assent either to all the positions I have described (and to the others too) or 
to some of them. It is not possible to assent to all: we shall surely not be able to assent 
both to Asclepiades, who says that the elements are frangible and possess qualities, and to 
Democritus, who asserts that they are atomic and qualityless, and to Anaxagoras, who 
allows his uniform stuffs every perceptible quality.”30 
 
Sextus uses the same strategy when he investigates what should be understood by ‘the good’ (to 
agathon): “When [the Dogmatists] are asked what it is which has these attributes [namely, that it 
benefits, that it is chosen and that it produces happiness, J.D.] they fall into a war without truce, some 
saying that it is virtue, others pleasure, others absence of pain, others something else.”31 On the basis 
of this, he concludes: “It is impossible to be convinced either by all the positions set out above 
(because of the conflict) or by any one of them.”32 The conflict (hè machè) is a problem for Sextus; he 
doesn’t indicate why and it is apparently a fundamental thought (and criterion) for him that a position 
and its opposite can’t be true at the same time. (One can maintain the other issue in the train of thought 
in III, 182, that one can’t prefer one of the positions to the other, without having to resort to the 
principle of contradiction.) 
When dealing with movement, Sextus uses, as has been pointed out in section 2.1.1, the 
principle of excluded middle. In the same context, the principle of contradiction receives attention; this 
time not from someone else’s perspective, like Diodorus Cronus’s, but from that of Sextus himself. He 
ingeniously shows that self-movement is impossible (only within a context, of course, since it can’t in 
the end be decided if there is movement or not): “If [whatever moves itself] moves itself by pushing, it 
will be behind itself; if by pulling, in front of itself; if by lifting, below; if by depressing, above. But it 
is impossible for anything to be above or [Page 43] in front of or below or behind itself. It is therefore 
impossible for anything to be moved by itself.”33 
Sextus has more to say about the problems which accompany the question concerning the 
generation and destruction of things than he does in passage III, 112 when he implicitly agrees with 
the principle of excluded middle (cf. section 2.1.1) as well. One may say that nothing is destroyed; 
here, first of all the principle of excluded middle applies: “If anything is destroyed, either what is 
existent or what is non-existent is destroyed.”34 Further, with regard to the existent, the following 
applies: “(…) It is destroyed either while remaining in the state of being existent or while not so 
remaining. If while remaining in the state of being existent, the same thing will at the same time be 
                                                     
29 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, I, 61 (p. 18). 
30 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, III, 33 (p. 151). 
31 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, III, 175 (p. 190). 
32 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, III, 182 (p. 192). 
33 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, III, 69 (p. 163). 
34 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, III, 113 (p. 174). 
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both existent and non-existent (…).”35 This is impossible, however, for: “(…) It is absurd to say that 
the same thing is both existent and non-existent.”36 
About place, too, more can be said than merely with the aid of the principle of excluded 
middle. If one examines how a place could originate, a contradiction is found: 
 
“(…) It is argued that when a body enters a void and a place comes into being, the void 
either remains or withdraws or is destroyed. But if it remains, the same thing will be both 
full and void. If it withdraws by way of local motion or is destroyed by changing, then the 
void will be a body (…). But it is absurd to say that the same thing is void and full, or that 
a void is a body. Therefore it is absurd to say that a void can be occupied by a body and 
become a place.”37 
 
Sextus again uses the word ‘absurd’ (atopos) and again there is a reasonable criterion involved which 
serves him in his inquiry. 
 
2.1.3 
 
The fact that reasonable criteria are utilised in Sextus’s examination, in which logic implicitly serves 
as a means, is, in my opinion, sufficient to conclude that he can’t be characterised as a radical sceptic, 
because he, by holding on to these, does not suspend judgement in each case. The places where this 
can be shown most convincingly are, however, those where Sextus explicitly speaks of ‘truth’. There 
are three passages in the Outlines where this happens. 
In the context of the fourth of the modes (tropoi), the one which depends on circumstances, 
Sextus points out why one can’t decide on anomalies about the appearances: 
 
“Anyone who prefers one appearance to another and one circumstance to another does so 
either without making a judgement and without proof or making a judgement and 
offering a proof. But he can do so neither without these (for he will be unconvincing) nor 
yet with them. For if he judges the appearances he will certainly judge them by means of 
a standard.”38 
 
It is of importance what Sextus says about this standard: “(…) He will say of this standard either that it 
is true or that it is false. If false, he will be unconvincing. But if he says that it is true, then he will say 
that the standard is true either without proof [Page 44] or with proof.”39 Apparently, the only 
possibilities which exist are true and false; a middle course, in which something is neither, is absent 
and Sextus is content when he has examined and refuted both possibilities. 
 Meanwhile, the status of this passage is dubious in the sense that it is possible that Sextus 
merely represents the way of thinking of an opponent; after all, the position of ‘anyone who prefers 
one appearance to another’ is described. For this reason, this fragment could have been treated in 
section 2.1.1 as well. Still, there are fragments in which Sextus describes his own position. 
 In answering the question whether something is true by nature, Sextus discusses four 
possibilities. Things are true, false, false nor true or both true and false. He gives some persuasive 
arguments to demonstrate the impossibility of the first three situations. In order to do this for the first 
two of these, he does require the principle of contradiction. There would only be an implicit logical 
structure, as is the case for the passages quoted in section 2.1.2, were it not that another analysis than 
this is given for the fourth situation. Here, Sextus explicitly agrees with the idea that something cannot 
be true and false at the same time: “(…) That which has a nature such as to be true will certainly not 
be false.”40 
                                                     
35 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, ibid. 
36 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, III, 114 (p. 174). 
37 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, III, 129 (p. 178). 
38 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, I, 114 (p. 30). 
39 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, I, 115 (p. 30). 
40 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, II, 87 (p. 89). 
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With regard to the question whether something can be taught, finally, Sextus says that 
something which is taught is either true or false,41 which is, I think, again a confirmation that Sextus 
maintains logical (reasonable) criteria, in this case the principle of excluded middle. 
Of the three logical laws, Sextus maintains two, namely the principle of contradiction and that 
of excluded middle, explicitly. The third, that of identity, is not explicitly affirmed by him. However, 
there is no escaping implicitly agreeing with it. After all, once he, after having mentioned a certain 
thesis, quotes this same thesis, he presupposes a continuity: the thesis has the same meaning at the first 
occurrence as it does at the second.42  
This is, of course, no point of criticism in the sense that this principle should not play a role in 
Sextus’s argumentation, since it is inevitable if a number of thoughts are expounded, but it is in the 
sense that Sextus, as a sceptic, can’t, from this position, agree with any criterion and therefore with 
any principle (be it logical or not). The criticism directed at Sextus is not that he does not give a 
reasonable exposition, but that he does. 
 
2.2 
 
Section 2.1 was focused on a demonstration of Sextus’s use of some reasonable criteria. Yet some 
room is needed for nuance. Sextus arms himself against a criticism of this sort by careful formulations 
and various ways to avoid direct attacks. It is, however, to be decided whether this defence suffices. 
This will be examined in the rest of this section. [Page 45] 
 As has yet been remarked, there is one criterion with which the sceptic agrees, namely that 
which appears. In practice one has to act in some way or other. One can’t avoid living in accordance 
with everyday observations: “(…) For we are not able to be utterly inactive.”43 Indeed, one can’t, as 
long as one lives, avoid living in a certain way. This does not mean, however, that one has to agree 
with reasonable criteria. When Sextus agrees with reasonable criteria, such as logical laws, however, 
he utilises such rules and doesn’t adhere to the minimal demand to accept only that which appears. 
After all, these rules are themselves means which one uses to approach the appearance, as becomes 
clear when Sextus uses them to judge and appreciate the opinions with which he is confronted (that 
which appears). When he claims to suspend his judgement with regard to the question whether there is 
a standard or not44 and says this on the basis of the fact that one may convey arguments both for and 
against this, he bases this on the thought that it can’t be the case that both parties are right. In this case, 
the principle of contradiction precedes the suspension of judgement, which means that a criterion has 
been used. 
 When Sextus indicates that the standard by means of which something is to be decided is 
unreal (anhuparktos),45 he fails to consider that he, in order to be able to claim this, must already have 
utilised a standard. This applies to the situation which is the result of suspending judgement, the 
equilibrium (arrepsia): “(…) Because of the equipollence of the opposed objects we end in 
equilibrium (By ‘equipollence’ we mean equality in what appears plausible to us; by ‘opposed’ we 
mean in general conflicting; and by ‘equilibrium’ we mean assent to neither side.).”46 Here, after all, it 
is supposed that it is impossible for two opposites both to be the case, which is a reasonable criterion. 
 A statement which seems to guard Sextus from any possible criticism is made in the context of 
the eighth mode: “The eighth mode is the one deriving from relativity, by which we conclude that, 
since everything is relative, we shall suspend judgement as to what things are independently and in 
their nature. It should be recognised that here, as elsewhere, we use ‘is’ loosely, in the sense of 
‘appears’, implicitly saying ‘Everything appears relative’.”47 Sextus indicates not to want to claim 
anything concerning the being of things and only to want to describe the appearances. Meanwhile, the 
                                                     
41 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, III, 253 (p. 209). 
42 I can’t agree with an approach that seeks a solution for this problem through the aid of another sort of logic 
(cf. in this respect, for example, Woleński, J. “Scepticism and Logic”, pp. 191, 192). 
43 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, I, 23 (p. 9). 
44 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, II, 18 (p. 72). 
45 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, II, 69 (p. 84). 
46 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, I, 190 (p. 47). 
47 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, I, 135 (p. 35). 
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question arises whether this is in agreement with his approach. If everything has to be treated as 
merely appearing, this applies to the arguments Sextus uses to demonstrate the untenability of the 
statements of the dogmatists just as well. When he says, for instance: “(…) It is absurd to say that the 
same thing is both existent and non-existent.”48 (cf. section 2.1.2), he merely means: ‘It appears 
absurd (…)’, but if this is the case, his statements have no persuasiveness and lack any value. If Sextus 
says his arguments must be maintained, he doesn’t qualify as a sceptic; if he, on the other hand, 
relativises them, they can merely serve as appearances and lack the force to be means for a serious 
criticism of the points of view of the dogmatists. 
Sextus not only gives this general thesis, but also nuances specific statements. After having 
stated that places are either generated or not (cf. section 2.1.2), [Page 46] he remarks on the coming to 
be of places, questioning whether they contain a body or not. He reports these two possibilities, but 
also makes an additional statement: “(…) If places come into being neither when a body is in them nor 
when it is not, and if no option apart from these can be conceived of, then places are not generated 
(…).”49 Elsewhere, too, Sextus comes up with this ‘escape route’; after having stated that that which is 
taught is either true or false,50 a modification follows: “(…) If neither what is false nor what is true is 
taught, and if there is nothing teachable apart from them (…), then nothing is taught.”51 
Perhaps Sextus means this in the other cases where he deals with the principle of excluded 
middle as well. If this is the case, however, the objection just made applies, namely that no real 
statement is made. Moreover, if this is Sextus’s position, he hasn’t indicated why the other possibility 
(or -ies) than true and false is (or are) acceptable; in each instance he has only said of a thesis and its 
opposite why they can’t be the case, without taking into consideration other options. The manner in 
which he describes his treatment of the principle of the principle of contradiction looks like the general 
thesis; Sextus doesn’t want, as the Heracliteans do, to state that opposites are the case; he merely 
wants to say that these appear to occur: “(…) While the Sceptics say that contraries appear to hold of 
the same thing, the Heracliteans go on from there to the idea that they actually do hold.”52 
If this is Sextus’s attitude, however, he seems to have reached his goal, tranquillity, sooner 
than he himself thought: tranquillity should follow from the fact that one doesn’t agree with any of 
both opposite positions and suspends judgement, but if one states that it merely appears that opposites 
are the case, one has already suspended judgement and there is no need to deal with the opposition. 
Another problem is involved with the way in which Sextus denies to cling to the principle of 
identity. He describes two positions, the first coming down to agreeing with the principle and the 
second denying its value.53 Sextus’s own position is that “(…) It will no doubt seem impossible for 
this dispute to be decided.”54 From his statement that there are, except for the appearance, no criteria, 
this can be maintained, but it leads to a problem; it seems that one has to appeal to this principle, 
independent of the way one argues or thinks. The reason why this is the case has been indicated in 
section 2.1.3 and will be explained further in section 3, when an alternative for Sextus’s analysis will 
be given. 
For now, it seems to be clear that Sextus, as long as he wants his arguments to have a 
meaning, can’t avoid agreeing with his own expositions of the logical principles. [Page 47] 
 
 
3. Radical scepticism and the alternative 
 
It has been examined in section 2 to what extent the logical principles play a role in Sextus’s 
argumentation. He appears to agree with two logical laws, which can be doubted (cf. section 1), which 
means that he can’t be characterised as a radical sceptic. To what extent, however, is radical 
                                                     
48 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, III, 114 (p. 174). 
49 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, III, 133 (p. 179). 
50 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, III, 253 (p. 209; cf. section 2.1.3). 
51 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, III, 253 (p. 209). 
52 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, I, 210 (p. 53). 
53 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, II, 111, 112 (p. 96). 
54 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, II, 113 (p. 96). 
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scepticism possible? Is one able to forgo every reasonable criterion and suspend judgement in each 
instance? This will be inquired in this last section. 
 I have so far left the question about the status of the third logical law, the principle of identity, 
open, since it seems harder to undermine its position than that of the other two (cf. section 1). Sextus 
suspends, as appeared in section 2.2, his judgement concerning this issue, but is this possible? This 
principle has, in the course of time, been subjected to little doubt. 
 The radical thinker Cratylus is an exception. He seems (in the role he plays in Plato’s dialogue 
which bears his name), following Heraclitus, to have claimed that something, while one speaks about 
it, changes so much that one no longer speaks of the same thing a moment later. This emerges in the 
context in which Socrates shows Cratylus the strange consequences of Cratylus’s conclusion: 
“SOCRATES: (…) If [the beautiful] is always passing away, can we correctly say of it first that it is 
this, and then that it is such and such? Or, at the very instant we are speaking, isn’t it inevitably and 
immediately becoming a different thing and altering and no longer being as it was? CRATYLUS: It 
is.”55 After that, Socrates concentrates on the epistemological implications Cratylus’s conclusion has: 
“SOCRATES: (…) It isn’t even reasonable to say that there is such a thing as knowledge, Cratylus, if 
all things are passing on and none remain.”56 
 In general, one may conclude that a continuity in thought is required to give an argumentation. 
After all, if one should want to consider earlier claims, this continuity must be supposed. This is of 
importance in the criticism of Sextus, since he supposes this as well: a prerequisite for his discourse is 
that the meanings are constant. He therefore – implicitly – agrees with the principle of identity, even 
though he claims to suspend his judgement in the matter. 
 The logical laws are not the only reasonable criteria one can maintain, of course. It is of 
importance to examine which other criteria are utilised in general and in Sextus’s thoughts in 
particular. Hans Albert has pointed out that the need to find a basis for everything finally results in one 
of three alternatives (the so-called Münchhausen-Trilemma): 
 
“Here, one has a mere choice between: 
1. an infinite regression, which appears because of the necessity to go ever further back, but 
isn’t practically feasible and doesn’t, therefore, provide a certain foundation; 
2. a logical circle in the deduction, which is caused by the fact that one, in the need to found, 
falls back on statements which had already appeared before as requiring a foundation, and 
which circle does not lead to any certain foundation either; and finally: [Page 48] 
3. a break of searching at a certain point, which indeed appears principally feasible, but 
would mean a random suspension of the principle of sufficient reason.”57 
 
The third alternative simply means clinging to a dogma; there is no talk of a situation in which 
reasonable criteria need play a role and this is not of importance here. The first two options, however, 
are. If one, in order to enervate a position, utilises the infinite regression or the circular reasoning, one 
reasons. 
The relevance for Sextus’s argumentation becomes apparent when one investigates the places 
where he utilises the first two alternatives. The central passage where the infinite regression receives 
attention is in book 1, in the treatment of the five modes: “In the mode deriving from infinite regress, 
we say that what is brought forward as a source of conviction for the matter proposed itself needs 
another such source, which itself needs another, and so ad infinitum, so that we have no point from 
which to begin to establish anything, and suspension of judgement follows.”58 
A little further, the circle is dealt with, as the reciprocal mode: “The reciprocal mode occurs 
when what ought to be confirmatory of the object under investigation needs to be made convincing by 
the object under investigation; then, being unable to take either in order to establish the other, we 
suspend judgement about both.”59 
                                                     
55 Plato, Cratylus, 439d (p. 155). 
56 Plato, Cratylus, 440a (p. 155). 
57 Albert, H., Traktat über kritische Vernunft, p. 15. 
58 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, I, 166 (p. 41). 
59 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, I, 169 (p. 41). 
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Sextus uses both means on several occasions in his argumentation. An example of the infinite 
regression is given by him in the following: 
 
“(…) Objects cannot be judged in virtue of [appearances]. If some, how shall we judge 
that it is right to find to find these appearances convincing and those unconvincing? For if 
without an appearance, then they will grant that appearances are redundant for judging, 
since they will be saying that some objects can be judged apart from them. But if with an 
appearance, how will they get hold of the appearance which they are adducing for judging 
the other appearances?  And they will need another appearance in turn to judge this 
second appearance; and another to judge that, and so ad infinitum. But it is impossible to 
make infinitely many decisions. Therefore it is impossible to discover which appearances 
one must use as standards and which not.”60 
 
An instance in which the circle is used is the situation in which Sextus points out that one, in order to 
know the cause of a thing, must know its consequence and vice versa: 
 
“(…) It is impossible to conceive of a cause before apprehending its effect as an effect of 
it; for we recognize that it is a cause of its effect only when we apprehend the latter as an 
effect. But we cannot apprehend the effect of a cause as its effect if we have not 
apprehended the cause of the effect as its cause; for we think that we know that it is its 
effect only when we have apprehended its cause as a cause of it. Thus if, in order to 
conceive of a cause, we must already have recognized its effect, and in order to know its 
effect, as I have said, we must already know the cause, the reciprocal mode of puzzlement 
shows that both are inconceivable: the cause cannot be conceived of as a cause nor the 
effect as an affect; for each of them needs to be made convincing by the other, and we 
shall not know from which to begin to form the concept. Hence we shall not be able to 
assert that anything is a cause of anything.”61 [Page 49] 
 
The syllogism is discussed by Sextus as well, by the way. He states that conclusive arguments can’t be 
grasped: “(…) Conclusive arguments are inapprehensible. For if they are judged by deciding whether 
the consequent of a conditional follows the antecedent, and if this has been subject to undecidable 
dispute and is no doubt inapprehensible (…), then conclusive arguments too will be 
inapprehensible.”62 
Meanwhile, Sextus utilises the syllogism himself when he argues that the proof is an object of 
disagreement: “(…) Proof (…) is an object of disagreement. If we suspend judgement about signs, and 
proofs are a sort of sign, then it is necessary to suspend judgement about proofs too.”63 
Sextus can only defend himself against the analysis presented above by treating everything, in 
the way described in section 2.2, as an appearance. Here, too, this treatment is insufficient, however. 
As Priest rightly observes: “By maintaining skepticism Sextus is (…) committed to the view that it is 
rationally defensible. (…) His solution is simple; he denies that he maintains skepticism [in the sense 
of academic philosophy, from which Sextus dissociates himself (cf. Outlines of Scepticism, I, 220-235 
(p. 57-62)), J.D.]. He neither asserts nor denies it.”64 This is no solution, however: 
 
“Unfortunately Sextus now appears to be asserting something else (to the effect that he is 
not asserting anything); and this is equally contradictory. Sextus could maintain that he is 
not really asserting this either. But this would be (a) equally contradictory; and (b) 
disingenuous. For, in making this utterance, Sextus does intend us thereby to believe that 
he asserts nothing; and this is exactly what assertion amounts to.”65 
                                                     
60 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, II, 76-78 (pp. 86, 87). 
61 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, III, 20-22 (p. 148). 
62 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, II, 145 (p. 105). 
63 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Scepticism, II, 134 (p. 102). 
64 Priest, G., Beyond the limits of thought, p. 51. 
65 Priest, G., Beyond the limits of thought, p. 52. 
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One may finally conclude that “(…) The attempt to avoid the contradiction at one limit of thought 
forces one into a contradiction at another.”66 
It seems, on account of the passages quoted in this section and the previous one, in which 
Sextus appears to hold on to reasonable criteria, justified to conclude that he is no radical sceptic since 
he does not always suspend judgement. Could he, however? Is radical scepticism, in which one 
suspends every judgement and deals with all appearances as appearances without agreeing with them, 
possible? 
Pyrrho actually seems to have lived his life according to this guideline, dealing only with the 
appearances. According to Diogenes Laertius, Pyrrho really lived as a sceptic: 
 
“He led a life consistent with this doctrine [that there is nothing really existent, but 
custom and convention govern human action, J.D.], going out of his way for nothing, 
taking no precaution, but facing all risks as they come, whether carts, precipices, dogs or 
what not, and, generally, leaving nothing to the arbitrament of the senses; but he was kept 
out of harm’s way by his friends who, as Antigonus of Carystus tells us, used to follow 
close after him.”67 
 
Although it is difficult to live like this, he seems at least to have tried to: “When a cur rushed at him 
and terrified him, he answered his critic that it was not easy entirely to strip oneself of human 
weakness; but one should strive with all one’s might against facts, by deeds if possible, and if not, in 
word.”68 [Page 50] 
Pyrrho didn’t write, either. In order to be a radical sceptic, one can’t claim anything, 
attempting thereby to reach beyond the level of appearances, since such a claim presupposes at least 
the continuity of the principle of identity. Moreover, in order to doubt everything, the means which 
one uses to doubt must be doubted, which means that (I now use an argument in which the infinite 
regression is utilised, but I haven’t characterised myself as a radical sceptic; I have, in fact, in the 
course of this article, utilised various criteria) one at no point has a means to commence doubting. 
Radical scepticism is not impossible, but if it is maintained, one can’t avoid having to stop thinking 
and to live without supposing continuity in life and frames for acting. 
The only alternative to both this sort of scepticism on the one hand and dogmatism on the 
other consists in dealing pragmatically with the criteria one maintains. By this, I mean pragmatism in 
the sense that one generally suspends judgement, like the sceptic, maintaining, however, some criteria. 
This looks like scepticism, because one is willing to review his or her opinions if these become 
problematic, but differs from it since reason is accepted as a constant, covering and decisive authority. 
This sort of pragmatism is, obviously, far from satisfactory, but it seems to me (at this 
moment) the only alternative. The criteria which have been discussed are maintained, but only as 
replaceable means. One may argue about the status of the principles of excluded middle and 
contradiction, but it seems that the principle of identity, the logical circle and the infinite regression, as 
these seem (at this moment) to be inevitable, need to be maintained. A sceptical attitude is not only 
possible, but desirable, too. A radical sceptical stance is possible as well, but it is doubtful whether this 
is just as desirable. 
 
  
Conclusion 
 
In this article, I have inquired to what extent Sextus Empiricus maintains reasonable criteria, in order 
to ascertain if he can be characterised as a sceptic and whether scepticism in its most radical form is 
possible. 
 In section 1, the basic logical laws were treated and it has been indicated why doubt about 
these is possible. The principles of excluded middle and contradiction are not maintained by all 
                                                     
66 Priest, G., Beyond the limits of thought, ibid. 
67 Diogenes Laertius, Lives of eminent philosophers, pp. 474, 475 (9, 62). 
68 Diogenes Laertius, Lives of eminent philosophers, pp. 478, 479 (9, 66). 
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logicians. Sextus’s clinging to all of these principles has been demonstrated in section 2; the manner in 
which he criticises dogmatists presupposes criteria. This is the basis of my criticism of Sextus. It was 
pointed out in three ways how the logical principles are of importance for Sextus. In section 2.1.1 on 
the one hand and sections 2.1.2 and 2.1.3 on the other, some passages were quoted in which he 
supports (or at least does not criticise) a certain argumentation which is based on these principles 
(section 2.1.1), or makes use of such an argumentation himself (section 2.1.2), or even explicitly 
agrees with the principles (section 2.1.3). In his criticism of the dogmatists, therefore, Sextus utilises 
criteria himself. 
This is needed for his criticism, but it doesn’t agree with the practise of a radical sceptic. This 
was expressed in section 2.2 as well. Sextus can’t consistently [Page 51] maintain only to speak at the 
level of appearances, because this means that his argumentation doesn’t become compelling. Not only 
the laws of logic, but some other reasonable criteria serve Sextus as well. In section 3 it was indicated 
which these are. This gives rise to expanding the criticism of Sextus. He seems to want something 
which is impossible: to be a sceptic and nevertheless hang on to criteria in order to have a method at 
his disposal to dispute the dogmatists. When he does this, he at the same time disputes himself. 
 Radical scepticism is, however, not impossible; one may live with only the appearances as a 
frame of reference. In fact, this is the only alternative to a situation in which one maintains criteria, 
irrespective of their nature. In the last part of the article, I have pleaded, on the other hand, for 
maintaining criteria, but in such a way that one deals with these pragmatically. No matter how 
persuasive the criteria one uses may seem to be, their value may, just as that of the principles of 
excluded middle and contradiction, be doubted in the future. 
 The title of this article is twofold. On the one hand, a sceptical attitude leads to the conclusion 
that many solutions in philosophy and other areas to questions of various sorts do not suffice. On the 
other hand, this attitude appears to be problematic itself in the sense that it accepts elements it 
disputes. The problems of scepticism are insoluble for any form of scepticism except for the radical 
kind. One may either resort to this or accept the problems and deal with the issues one is confronted 
with. I would, as indicated in section 3, like to plead a moderate kind of scepticism (pragmatism), in 
which one holds on to some (seemingly) inevitable criteria and further has a careful attitude. 
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